Selective Application of the Fourth Amendment: United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez by Mitchell, Janet E.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 41 
Issue 1 Fall 1991 Article 13 
1991 
Selective Application of the Fourth Amendment: United States v. 
Verdugo-Urquidez 
Janet E. Mitchell 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Janet E. Mitchell, Selective Application of the Fourth Amendment: United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 41 
Cath. U. L. Rev. 289 (1992). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol41/iss1/13 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
THE SELECTIVE APPLICATION OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT: UNITED
STATES V VERDUGO-URQUIDEZ
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
"the people" the right to be free from unreasonable and unwarranted
searches and seizures.' The amendment includes a reasonableness clause
and a Warrant Clause, both of which are designed to protect individuals'
interests in the privacy of their possessions and homes.2 Courts measure the
reasonableness of a search by weighing the government's interest in effective
law enforcement against the individual's privacy expectation.3 The Warrant
Clause of the Fourth Amendment is one element in determining the reasona-
bleness of a search and seizure. The Warrant Clause mandates that absent
exigent circumstances,4 a neutral magistrate may issue a search warrant only
if there is probable cause to believe that the objects described in the officer's
affidavit will be found at the search area.5 A Fourth Amendment analysis
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. This amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
2. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (holding that where a policeman
entered and searched an individual's home without probable cause or a search warrant, the
Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to privacy of one's home and belongings and only a
judicial determination of the reasonableness of the search can infringe that right).
3. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (holding that
reasonableness depends on all circumstances surrounding search and seizure); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968) (holding that a policeman can stop and frisk an individual, without
probable cause or a warrant, if he has a reasonable suspicion that crime is afoot and that the
individual may be armed).
4. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978) (holding that warrants are not re-
quired when safety concerns are at issue); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969)
(holding that warrants are not required for searches of persons or surrounding areas incident
to a lawful arrest); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (holding that warrants
are not required when there is possible imminent destruction of evidence); Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964) (same).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (holding that
"[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common sense decision
whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him . . . there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place").
An arrest is constitutionally valid only if there exists "probable cause to make it-whether
at that moment the facts and circumstances within [the officer's] knowledge and of which they
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need only be applied if United States officials have conducted a search and
seizure and if the individual whose property was seized is entitled to consti-
tutional protection.
6
As a component of the Bill of Rights, the Fourth Amendment reflects the
Framers' aversion towards general warrants and writs of assistance that
were commonly issued under pre-revolutionary English rule.7 While the de-
termination of whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred focuses
on the actions of the government's agents, courts must also decide whether
individuals merit this constitutionally mandated warrant protection.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the Constitution is appli-
cable extraterritorially.8 Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that the nat-
ural rights guaranteed under the Bill of Rights may extend to non-United
States citizens.9 Legal and illegal aliens have been found to possess rights
against discrimination' ° and arbitrary searches and seizures,"1 as well as
had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing
that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89,
91 (1964); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c).
6. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393-94 (1914) (holding that evidence a state
police officer seized in an unwarranted search and turned over to a United States Marshal must
be excluded from use in a federal trial).
7. William J. Cuddihy, Fourth Amendment (Historical Origins) in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 761 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986). The general warrant
was open-ended and allowed the bearer to search for a person or thing at his discretion, with-
out delineating the specifics of either the person or object sought. The Fourth Amendment's
warrant and reasonableness requirements theoretically preclude a general targeting of innocent
individuals based on political or personal prejudice.
8. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-8 (1957) (holding that when a United States citizen is
tried in a military court outside the United States, the limitations imposed on the government
by Article III, Section 2 and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution protect that
citizen). "[C]onstitutional protections for the individual were designed to restrict the United
States Government when it acts outside of this country, as well as here at home." Id. at 7.
9. See cases cited infra notes 10-12.
10. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215 (1982) (holding that children of illegal aliens
cannot be discriminated against under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment with regard to access to free public education); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S.
590, 596 (1953) (holding that a resident alien has a right to due process under the Fifth
Amendment in an attempt by United States officials to exclude his re-entrance into the United
States).
11. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050-51
(1984) (holding that Mexican citizens subject to deportation proceedings have Fourth Amend-
ment protections at the time of their arrest); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266,
273 (1973) (holding that a Mexican citizen's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures was violated when authorities searched his car twenty miles from
the Mexican border without probable cause or consent, when he was working in the United
States with a valid work permit); Au Yi Lau v. United States Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 445 F.2d 217, 223 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that "aliens in this country are sheltered by the
Fourth Amendment in common with citizens"), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971).
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guarantees of freedom of speech 2 and a right to public education. 3 Before
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,14 however, the Court had not deter-
mined whether the Constitution protected nonresident aliens, held in the
United States on federal criminal narcotics charges, from unwarranted
searches and seizures performed outside the United States.
In Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court held that a nonresident alien incarcerated
in the United States on federal criminal narcotics charges for a crime com-
mitted outside of the United States was not a "person" under the Fourth
Amendment.' 5 Mexican police kidnapped Verdugo-Urquidez and trans-
ported him to the United States border where United States Drugs Enforce-
ment Agency (DEA) officers arrested him.16 Subsequent to the arrest, DEA
agents, in conjunction with Mexican officials, searched two of Verdugo-Ur-
quidez's Mexican residences without obtaining a United States search
warrant. 
1 7
Verdugo-Urquidez challenged the admissibility of the evidence seized in
the search, arguing that, without a warrant, any evidence found in either of
his residences should be suppressed. The United States District Court for
the Southern District of California held that the Fourth Amendment con-
trolled in a search conducted as a "joint venture"'" by United States and
Mexican agents. Accordingly, the court concluded that the exclusionary
rule barred the admission of the seized drugs.' 9 A divided Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the Constitution extended to
an official extraterritorial government action and guaranteed protections to
individuals directly "governed" by the United States.2' First, the Court
noted that Verdugo-Urquidez was a target of a United States investigation.
Second, they pointed out that Verdugo-Urquidez was in custody in the
United States at the time of the search and that he was subject to full adver-
sarial proceedings. The appellate court determined, therefore, that Verdugo-
Urquidez was effectively under the domain of the United States government,
one of the "governed," and entitled to constitutional protection.2 '
12. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) (holding that an alien resident is accorded
First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and press).
13. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
14. 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
15. Id. at 1066.
16. Id. at 1059.
17. Id.
18. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1215 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd 110 S.
Ct. 1056 (1990); see also infra notes 112-24 and accompanying text.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1230.
21. Id.
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The United States Supreme Court overruled the court of appeals in a plu-
rality opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist. The Court held that the
Fourth Amendment does not protect nonresident aliens from unwarranted
searches and seizures and that the Constitution does not apply extraterritori-
ally in a criminal prosecution.22 Relying on the text of the Constitution,
Chief Justice Rehnquist maintained that the Framers had not intended to
include nonresident aliens in the compact of the Constitution and that
Verdugo-Urquidez had not established a sufficient connection to the United
States to warrant constitutional protection. 23 He asserted that to hold other-
wise would hamper the execution of foreign policy and international law
enforcement. Accordingly, the Court effectively limited the scope of the
Fourth Amendment to apply solely intraterritorially and exclusively to those
individuals in contract with the Constitution.24 Thus, the Court now allows
for unwarranted and, foreseeably, unreasonable searches whenever the ac-
tion is conducted outside United States borders against non-United States
citizens.
A recent trend in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence limits the class of
protected parties while at the same time reduces constraints on government
agents conducting evidentiary searches. 25 Verdugo-Urquidez continues that
trend and in part reflects the political climate of the late 1980s. President
Bush's "war on drugs"26 suggests that the executive branch wishes to allow
federal prosecutors broad investigative authority in criminal prosecutions.
The Supreme Court has responded by expanding the exceptions to the appli-
cation of the Fourth Amendment and by maintaining a deferential posture
towards the executive in its execution of foreign policy.
This Note examines the state of the law prior to Verdugo-Urquidez and
discusses the varying theoretical constructs concerning the scope of the Con-
stitution's application to United States citizens and resident and nonresident
22. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1036, 1066 (1990).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. In Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990), the Court held that police officers may
search an entire house incident to an in-house arrest if they have reasonable suspicion that a
dangerous individual is inside. Id. at 337. Buie substantially expanded the area allowed to be
searched incident to an arrest. Prior to this holding, a police officer could only search the
individual and his immediate surrounding area. See also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989) (holding that drug and alcohol tests mandated by the Federal
Railroad Administration are constitutional under the Fourth Amendment despite the lack of
probable cause or reasonable suspicion). Skinner limits the types of citizens protected from
unreasonable or arbitrary searches under the Fourth Amendment to those who are not em-
ployees as defined by the Federal Railroad Safety Act. Id. at 628.
26. See George J. Church, Fighting Back; Bush Declares Another War on Drugs But It
May Not Help Much, TIME, Sept. 11, 1989, at 12.
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aliens, within the United States and extraterritorially. The Note shows that
Verdugo-Urquidez, by reversing precedent, continues a developing Court
trend to defer to the executive and legislative branches in issues of foreign
criminal investigations and prosecutions. This Note also projects potential
domestic and international ramifications of Verdugo-Urquidez. The Note
concludes that the Court, in limiting the breadth of the Fourth Amendment,
will encourage United States federal officials involved in extraterritorial gov-
ernment actions to engage in activity not compatible with Fourth Amend-
ment protections. The Note maintains that this result will diminish, in the
eyes of the world community, the credibility of the values and ideals upon
which the United States purports to be based.
I. THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL APPLICATION
A. The General Scope of the Constitution
The United States Supreme Court addressed three separate yet related ar-
eas of legal history in construing its theory of constitutional application in
United States v. Verdugo- Urquidez." The first area deals generally with con-
stitutional theories of entitlement and geographic limitations. The second
area focuses on the meaning and practices of the Fourth Amendment in
general. The third area centers on the specific application of the Fourth
Amendment extraterritorially. The Court relies on historical interpretations
of the Constitution and the Framers' intent, as well as precedent, to map out
the evolution of these broader themes.
The drafters of the Bill of Rights neither included any explicit references
to geographical limitations of constitutional applicability nor delineated spe-
cific individual characteristics that would necessarily preclude or include a
person in the covenant of the Constitution.28 Many constitutional scholars
agree, however, that the Framers did not foresee extending the application of
the Fourth Amendment beyond United States territory.29 At the same time,
the Framers did not explicitly limit constitutional protections to a specified
27. 110 S. Ct. at 1056.
28. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
709 (1987).
29. See Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience.- Individual Rights
Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 11, 32 (1985); Gerard L. Neuman, Whose
Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 912 (1991); John A. Ragosta, Aliens Abroad: Principles for
the Application of Constitutional limitations to Federal Action, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
287, 288 (1985); see also Roszell D. Hunter, IV, Note, The Extraterritorial Application of the
Constitution-Unalienable Rights?, 72 VA. L. REV. 649, 653 (1986); Note, Constructing the
State Extraterritorially: Jurisdictional Discourse, the National Interest, and Transnational
Norms, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1273, 1276 (1990).
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group of individuals, and scholars have interpreted the scope of constitu-
tional application in a number of ways. a°
One prevailing interpretation of constitutional application is the social
compact theory, which evolved out of a medieval concept of a contract of
government that a monarch entered into with his subjects.31 This theory
broadened over time to encompass an individual's voluntary submission to
government authority in exchange for the protection and civilizing force of
organized government.32 Entitlement to constitutional protection resulted
from being a member of the contracting party by birthright or by acquisi-
tion, thereby establishing fundamental ties to the national community.
Under this theory, aliens abroad are "neither parties to nor beneficiaries of
the agreement between the federal government and the people embodied in
the Constitution., 33
A second approach views the Constitution as guaranteeing certain inalien-
able rights to individuals and protecting them from government encroach-
ment via the Bill of Rights.34 Those that subscribe to this theory see the
Constitution as an " 'organic' act giving 'life' to the federal government...
30. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and In-
ternational Law, Continued, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 444, 454 (1990). Professor Lowenfeld posits
that the Court has two conflicting theories of constitutional application. One theory regards
the Bill of Rights as limiting the official actions of the government, thereby protecting an
individual's inherent and natural rights. The other theory postulates that protections are
granted to "persons" via the Constitution. According to Lowenfeld, it usually does not matter
which theory is adopted when the Court examines the constitutionality of an issue, but a con-
flict arises when the individual defendant does not readily fall into the class of people who are
considered "persons" for constitutional purposes. Id.
31. Neuman, supra note 29, at 921; see also Henkin, supra note 29, at 30; Ragosta, supra
note 29, at 301.
32. Neuman, supra note 29, at 916. Neuman describes four separate theories of constitu-
tional application, falling into two camps. The membership or social compact theory measures
the relationship between the individual and the government. Id. at 917-18. The universalists'
theory considers the inalienable rights of individuals as superior to federal authority to act. Id.
at 916-17. This theory embraces the notion that the Constitution is a fundamental law which
protects all individuals from unreasonable government intrusion.
The second camp focuses on territorial limitations. Those who follow a municipal law ap-
proach view the Constitution as extending as far as its sovereign authority does. Id. at 918.
Federal action requires constitutional constraint if the action is committed in United States
controlled territories. The final view regards the Constitution as containing a limited restric-
tive role, in that it guarantees a protection of fundamental due process regardless of where the
federal activity occurs. Id. at 919. This theory, followed by Justice Blackmun in his concur-
rence in Verdugo-Urquidez, is called the "global due process" approach. Id. at 919.
33. Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Reach of the Bill of Rights Beyond the Terra Firma of the
United States, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 741, 782 (1980). Professor Ragosta points out, however, that
the only time the Court has applied such a restrictive privity doctrine was in Scott v. Sanford,
60 U.S. 393 (1857), roundly repudiated in subsequent legal scholarship. Ragosta, supra note
29, at 301.
34. Neuman, supra note 29, at 916; see also Saltzburg, supra note 33.
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[which] cannot exercise powers withheld by the Constitution." '35 This the-
ory limits United States action by constitutional constraints, allowing the
government to exercise only those powers specifically enumerated in the arti-
cles and amendments to the Constitution.36 Following this approach, the
Court has held that the Constitution guarantees certain rights to non-citi-
zens residing in the United States legally or illegally."
The United States Supreme Court has followed both views when interpret-
ing the Constitution. For example, in 1886 the Court expressly addressed
whether the Constitution protected resident aliens in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.38
The Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment protected Chinese aliens legally residing in San Francisco from dis-
criminatory municipal ordinances. The Court asserted that legal aliens
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States were entitled to the
same Fourteenth Amendment protections as United States citizens. 39 After
Yick Wo, the Court extended fundamental rights to aliens legally residing in
the United States and allowed for a varying degree of protection for tempo-
rary and illegal aliens."
35. Neuman, supra note 29, at 916.
36. Saltzburg, supra note 33, at 745. For an in-depth discussion of the historical bases for
these theories of constitutional application, see Neuman, supra note 29.
37. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953) (Fifth Amendment);
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) (First Amendment); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United
States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931) (Just Compensation Clause); Wong Wing v. United States, 163
U.S. 228 (1896) (Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886) (Fourteenth Amendment); see supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
38. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Prior to the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 (Acts), the express
issue of whether the Constitution protected aliens within the United States had not been ad-
dressed by any language in the Bill of Rights, nor explicitly by the Framers. Arising out of a
conflict between Federalists and Republicans, the Acts allowed for the expulsion of aliens on
an order of the President. In the congressional debates over the Acts, the Federalists relied on
a membership theory of the Constitution, arguing that aliens were not "persons" under the
Constitution and, therefore, not party to its protections. Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, 1
Stat. 576, 577, 596. The Republicans maintained a "municipal law" approach which held that
the Constitution was a law which allowed limited constitutional protections to aliens in ex-
change for a "temporary obedience." A modified rights analysis to constitutional entitlements
emerged from these acts which protected aliens against the states and was supported by the
Marshall Court. Neuman, supra note 29, at 927-39.
39. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369. The Court stated:
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of
citizens.... The questions we have to consider.., are to be treated as involving the
rights of every citizen of the United States equally with those of the strangers and
aliens who now invoke the jurisdiction of the court.
Id. By holding that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applied to
aliens, the Court set the stage for the eventual incorporation of due process protections to the
states. Ragosta, supra note 29, at 295-96.
40. See cases cited supra notes 10-12.
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B. Specific Rights of Aliens Under the Constitution
In Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding,4" United States officials had attempted to
bar an alien from reentering the United States, and the Court held that resi-
dent aliens have a Fifth Amendment due process right. The Court reasoned
that an alien's development of permanent ties to the United States merited
him protection under the Bill of Rights.42 In Graham v. Richardson,43 the
Court considered whether a state could set a residency requirement for legal
aliens' eligibility for welfare benefits." In Graham, an Arizona Act45 man-
dated a fifteen year residency requirement before eligibility accrued. Peti-
tioner challenged the act under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause.46 The Court applied strict scrutiny analysis and deter-
mined that no justifiable distinction could be made between aliens and citi-
zens, reasoning that aliens also contributed to the state's economy and
community.47
In 1982, the Court considered the extent to which illegal aliens residing in
the United States are "persons" for the purposes of constitutional protection.
In Plyler v. Doe,48 the Court applied a rational basis equal protection test to
a Texas statute that denied enrollment in public schools to children who had
not been legally admitted into the United States.49 The Court emphasized
that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that the state shall not deprive "any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." 50 The plurality maintained that aliens are "per-
sons" under both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, whether or not
they are legally in the United States. The Court rejected the state's argu-
ment that illegal aliens are beyond Texas' jurisdiction. 5 1
41. 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
42. Id. at 596.
43. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
44. Id. at 367.
45. ARIZONA REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-233 (Supp. 1970-71) (amended 1962).
46. Id. at 367-68.
47. Id. at 376.
48. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
49. Id. at 205.
50. Id. at 210. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
51. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 213. "The Equal Protection Clause was intended to work nothing
less than the abolition of all caste-based and invidious class-based legislation. That objective is
[Vol. 41:289
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Previously, the Court had decided that the Fourth Amendment protects
aliens legally within the United States but without residency status.52 In
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,53 the police stopped and searched the pe-
titioner, a Mexican citizen, without a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable
suspicion, approximately twenty miles from the Mexican-American bor-
der.54 The Court held that a search by a roving patrol in the absence of
probable cause violated the petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights.55 There-
fore, at least within the United States, legal and illegal aliens are "persons"
under the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and are thereby guar-
anteed protection from arbitrary state action under the Constitution.
The Court addressed the question of whether the Constitution protects
aliens outside of the United States in Johnson v. Eisentrager.6 In Johnson,
twenty-one German nationals petitioned the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia for writs of habeas corpus. Johnson involved
soldiers who had continued hostilities against the United States after the end
of World War II. A Military Commission constituted by a United States
Commanding General at Nanjing, pursuant to a special grant of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, tried and convicted the soldiers.57 The soldiers alleged that
their conviction and trial violated the Fifth Amendment as well as Articles I
and III of the United States Constitution.
The Johnson Court held that the Fifth Amendment does not apply to "all
persons," reasoning that the Constitution made no grant of Fifth Amend-
ment protection to enemy aliens because doing so would, in effect, give aliens
more protection than is provided to United States citizens.58 The Court
maintained that the Constitution did not extend to individuals outside of the
United States, holding that the Framers had not envisioned "[s]uch extrater-
ritorial application of organic law."59 The Court acknowledged that even if
the Constitution applied to those individuals, it would be impractical to en-
force." The Johnson Court admitted, however, that some constitutional
fundamentally at odds with the power the State asserts here to classify persons subject to its
laws as nonetheless excepted from its protection." IM.
52. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 267-68.
55. Id. at 273.
56. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
57. Id. at 766.
58. Id. at 783. "[B]y the most magnanimous view, our law does not abolish inherent
distinctions recognized throughout the civilized world between citizens and aliens . . . nor
between resident enemy aliens who have submitted themselves to our laws and nonresident
enemy aliens .... " Id. at 769.
59. Id. at 784.
60. Id. at 767.
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provisions might extend beyond "the citizenry," maintaining that "[tlhe
alien ... has been accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights as he
increases his identity with our society."6 1 The Court considered two criteria
in determining whether an individual is protected by the Bill of Rights.
First, the Court considered where the infraction occurred. Second, it evalu-
ated the extent and nature of the relationship between the individual and the
United States. 62 Because the soldiers were never within the territorial juris-
diction of United States courts and because they were enemies of the United
States, the Johnson Court held that they were not entitled to writs of habeas
corpus under the Constitution.63
Nearly thirty years later, United States v. Tiede " limited Johnson to its
facts. The United States Court for Berlin held that a Polish national tried
under United States laws in West Germany has the same constitutional pro-
tections as a United States citizen.65 Judge Stem heard the case and distin-
guished Johnson by emphasizing that the appellants in Johnson were enemy
nationals charged with violating the laws of war.6 6 By contrast, the appel-
lant in Tiede was a Polish citizen charged with hijacking a plane and forcing
it to land in West Berlin. 67 The appellant filed a motion demanding a jury
trial 68 and the court held that he had this right under the United States
Constitution.6 9 Judge Stem asserted that when an individual is tried in West
Berlin for a nonmilitary crime, "the United States must provide the defend-
ant[ ] with the same constitutional safeguards that it must provide to [a]
civilian defendant[ ] in any other United States court."
70
61. Id. at 770.
62. Id. at 777-78.
63. Id. at 781.
64. 86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S. Ct. for Berlin, 1979).
65. Id. at 260.
66. Id. at 245.
67. Id. at 228.
68. Id. at 229.
69. Id. at 260.
70. Id. For a thorough analysis of Tiede, see HERBERT J. STERN, JUDGMENT IN BERLIN
(1984).
Many federal courts have allowed for alien rights under the Constitution. See, e.g., United
States v. Cadena, 588 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Orman, 417 F. Supp. 1126 (D.
Colo. 1976); Williams v. Blount, 314 F. Supp. 1356 (D.D.C. 1970). Other courts, however,
have refused to endow aliens with the same depth of constitutional protections as United States
citizens. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1001 (1975); Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144 (D. Colo. 1976).
[Vol. 41:289
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C. Territorial Limitations on Constitutional Applicability
While courts dealt with the issue of what rights noncitizens had intra and
extraterritorially, a second line of cases emerged based on the territorial lim-
its of the Constitution's application. As noted,7 the Framers most likely did
not envision application of the Constitution outside United States borders.72
For a majority of the nineteenth century, however, the idea that the Consti-
tution "followed the flag" prevailed. As the United States asserted its domi-
nance as a colonial power in the international arena, extending
constitutional rights to persons outside the boundaries of the United States
proved inconvenient. The Court began to apply a membership theory of
constitutional participation which handily excluded extending constitutional
rights to members of territories not incorporated in the United States.7 3 The
Supreme Court adopted this theory in In re Ross.7 4 In Ross, an American
citizen challenged his conviction for murder adjudicated by the American
Consulate Tribunal in Japan by arguing that the Sixth Amendment of the
Constitution guaranteed him a jury trial.75 The Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction, holding that the Sixth Amendment right applies only to individ-
uals within the United States.7 6
After Ross, the Court decided a series of cases referred to as the Insular
cases. 77 The Insular cases considered whether constitutional protections ex-
tended to residents of territories under the control of the United States but
not a part of it. Residents of these territories had an uncertain constitutional
status; they were not citizens of the United States, yet United States laws
governed them. The Court maintained that the extension of constitutional
protections should be interpreted in a territorially restrictive manner.78 In
71. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
72. International law of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries mirrored this viewpoint.
At that time, international law did not recognize international individual rights, but rather
dealt with nations as entities. Hunter, supra note 29, at 653.
73. Neuman, supra note 29, at 958.
74. 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
75. Id. at 454, 461.
76. Id. at 465. The Court stated that:
By the Constitution a government is ordained and established 'for the United States
of America,' and not for countries outside of their limits. The guarantees it affords
•.. apply only to citizens and others within the United States, or [to those] who are
brought there for trial for alleged offenses committed elsewhere .... The Constitution
can have no operation in another country.
Id. at 464.
77. See infra notes 78-88 and accompanying text.
78. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901). While the Court argued that there were
territorial limitations on constitutional applicability, legislators in Congress were arguing that
the Constitution should blanket all people who fall under United States control. In its report
on the establishment of Puerto Rico, the 56th Congress stated that the "United States' author-
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Downes v. Bidwell,79 the Court addressed whether merchandise brought into
New York from Puerto Rico was exempt from a duty charge."0 The Court
had recently held that Puerto Rico was a territory of the United States," but
had not decided whether Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which
mandates uniform "duties, imposts and excises" throughout the United
States, applied to the island territory. 2 The Court examined the relation-
ship between the inhabitants of the territory and the United States. The
Court reasoned that to extend procedural rights to the territories would
prove unduly burdensome and was not required under the Constitution. 3
The majority limited the rights of non-United States citizens residing in a
territory of the United States to fundamental rights.8 4
In a second Insular case, Dorr v. United States,85 the Court rejected an
appellant's claim that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial applied to a
resident of the Philippines, then an unincorporated United States territory.
The Court reaffirmed Downes, holding that the Constitution did not require
Congress to adopt "a system of laws which shall include the right of trial by
jury" to aliens in territories that are ultimately governed by Congress.86 The
Court dismissed Congress' view that every constitutional provision is appli-
cable wherever the United States chooses to "exercise its power."8"
Two world wars later, the Court's territorially restrictive view of constitu-
tional application, while still in force, was losing its authority. As the
United States evolved as a superpower, and as the Warren Court's commit-
ment to human and civil rights grew, a new theory of constitutional entitle-
ment emerged s.8  Although the Court refused to grant aliens Fifth
ity to act abroad stems from the Constitution; the Government must therefore accept the limits
provided by the same document that is the source of its power." S. REP. No. 249, 56th Cong.,
1st Sess. 11 (1900). This sentiment was a clear departure from the membership theory of
constitutional entitlement that the Court put forward in the Insular cases.
79. 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
80. Id. at 247.
81. See De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901).
82. Downes, 182 U.S. at 249.
83. See id. at 284. The Court relied on the Constitution's silence on the issue of territorial
application, as well as on the executive and legislative branches' interpretation of this silence
over the previous 100 years as precluding constitutional extension. Id. at 286.
84. Id. at 282-83. The Court stated that "[e]ven if regarded as aliens, they are entitled
under the principles of the Constitution to be protected in life, liberty and property." Id. at
283.
85. 195 U.S. 138 (1904).
86. Id. at 149.
87. Id. at 147-49; see also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 783 (1950) (holding that
Fifth Amendment rights are not extended to aliens outside of the United States' territory).
88. Neuman, supra note 29, at 965.
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Amendment protection in Johnson v. Eisentrager,9 the majority did ac-
knowledge that aliens may merit some constitutional protection.9a
In 1957, the Supreme Court reexamined the issue of the extraterritorial
application of the Constitution in Reid v. Covert.9" The Court held that the
federal government is a "creature of the Constitution" and, therefore, official
United States action is subject to constitutional restraints.92 In Reid, the
wife of a serviceman charged with his murder challenged her conviction by a
military tribunal in Great Britain on the grounds that she had a right to a
jury trial under the Sixth Amendment. 9 The Court rejected the Insular
precedent, which denied any constitutional applicability extraterritorially,
and held that when the Government attempts to punish a citizen who is
abroad, "the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitu-
tion provide to protect his life and liberty should not be stripped away just
because he happens to be in another land." 94 The Reid Court rejected the
idea that the United States could operate abroad without the constraints of
the Bill of Rights.9 5 Reid thus limited the Insular cases to instances when
accused persons are tried by territorial authorities in territorial courts9 6 and
replaced the territorial and social compact focus of constitutional analysis
with what Professor Neuman calls a "municipal law" theory of the Constitu-
tion.97 This theory of constitutional employment applies the Bill of Rights
to nonresident aliens extraterritorially whenever the United States "seeks to
impose obligations upon them under United States law."98
In 1958, the Court held in Perez v. Brownell9 9 that certain constitutional
provisions restricted Congress from regulating foreign affairs.1 °° The peti-
89. 339 U.S. at 777-78, 781.
90. Id. at 770.
91. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
92. Id. at 5-6.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 14.
97. Neuman, supra note 29, at 918.
98. Neuman, supra note 29, at 918-19. Professor Neuman argues that after Reid, the
modern theory of constitutional application, prior to Verdugo-Urquidez, establishes rights in
three areas: (1) within the United States to all; (2) to United States citizens anywhere; and
(3) to aliens outside the United States affected by United States law. Id. at 919.
Professor Ragosta, however, interprets the Reid plurality to hold that the government's
authority and power to act is fully contingent on the powers enumerated in the Constitution.
Ragosta, supra note 29, at 294 & n.42. According to Ragosta, Reid "must be interpreted to
compel federal officials to act within the proscriptions of the Constitution regardless of
whether they act at home or abroad." Id. at 295.
99. 356 U.S. 44 (1958), overruled by Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
100. Id. at 58.
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tioner was a national of the United States who had lost his citizenship under
section 401(e) and (j) of the Nationality Act of 1940.01 The petitioner al-
leged that the statute went beyond congressional authority. Although the
Court upheld the constitutionality of section 401, the majority asserted that
the parameters of the Constitution limited Congress in its authority to act in
relation to other nations.10 2 This approach to constitutional application
abandoned the Ross theory of strict territoriality. 1 3 Reid and Perez reestab-
lished a theory of constitutional application that restricts federal activity in-
ternationally to those actions constitutionally enumerated, and protects, at
the very least, United States citizens from unconstitutional action abroad.
Although not explicitly conferring these rights to non-United States citizens,
lower courts had, until Verdugo- Urquidez, extended some constitutional
rights to nonresident aliens in search and seizure cases abroad or, alterna-
tively, had restricted federal government activity to constitutionally man-
dated actions.I°
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION
The Fourth Amendment's inclusion in the Bill of Rights resulted from the
Framers' aversion to random and open-ended searches and seizures which
were customary in colonial times.' 05 To avoid such unspecified seizures, the
authors of the Fourth Amendment included the Reasonableness and War-
rant Clauses so as to limit what would be acceptable acts on the part of
federal agents." Therefore, the Amendment has historically focused on
101. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137, amended by Act of Sept. 27, 1944, ch.
418, 58 Stat. 746.
102. Perez, 356 U.S. at 58. As the Court stated:
Broad as the power of the National Government to regulate foreign affairs must
necessarily be, it is not without limitation. The restrictions confining Congress in the
exercise of any of the powers expressly delegated to it in the Constitution apply with
equal vigor when that body seeks to regulate our relations with other nations.
Id.
103. Id. The American Law Institute's Restatement of Foreign Relations Law supports
this approach. It proposes that the Constitution should protect individual rights of non-resi-
dent citizens and aliens alike, when United States federal agents act extraterritorially. RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(l)-(2),
cmt. m (1987).
104. See infra notes 113-24 and accompanying text.
105. STORY, supra note 28, at 709. As Justice Story points out, the Fourth Amendment
codifies a common law principle which provides for the full enjoyment of property and per-
sonal rights. According to Justice Story, the Fourth Amendment evolved from the Framers'
heightened sensitivity to the issuance of general warrants which authorized government offi-
cials to seize any person without specialized description. Id. at 710.
106. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
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regulating and restricting unreasonable and arbitrary government action.107
To ensure that government agents do not overstep their constitutionally
mandated authority, the Supreme Court fashioned a procedural safeguard.
In Weeks v. United States, 08 the Court devised the exclusionary rule. Under
the exclusionary rule, evidence acquired through an illegal, unwarranted or
unreasonable search by federal officials in the United States cannot be used
against defendants in subsequent federal prosecutions.l° Prior to 1961, fed-
eral officials often acquired evidence that was excludable in federal court but
admissible in state court. In these instances, the federal officials turned the
evidence over to state officials on a "silver platter."' 1o The "silver platter"
doctrine enabled state officials to admit otherwise illegally acquired evidence,
thereby defeating the spirit of the exclusionary rule. The policy behind the
exclusionary rule was to discourage police action that ran counter to the
protections guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment."'
Under the current rule, however, any evidence seized in an illegal search
within the United States is subject to the exclusionary rule and inadmissible
in both federal and state criminal prosecutions. When evidence is procured
in foreign searches, however, the courts have retained the application of the
"silver platter" doctrine and regularly admit the unlawfully obtained evi-
dence. Courts limited the "silver platter" doctrine, however, to situations
where foreign officials conducted a search on foreign land without a United
States search warrant and then turned their evidence over to United States
officials.' 12
107. Id.
108. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
109. Id. at 398. In 1961, the exclusionary rule was incorporated through the Fourteenth
Amendment to the states in the landmark case of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
110. The "silver platter" doctrine was based on the argument that because prior to Mapp,
the exclusionary rule did not apply to evidence seized illegally under the Fourth Amendment
by state authorities, "material seized unconstitutionally by a state officer could be admitted in a
federal criminal proceeding.... [Flederal authorities... could profit from the State's [uncon-
stitutional] action by receiving on a silver platter evidence unconstitutionally obtained."
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 444-45 (1976); see also Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657 (describing
the converse application as follows: "[A] federal prosecutor may make no use of evidence
illegally seized, but a State's attorney across the street may .... Thus the State, by admitting
evidence unlawfully seized, serves to encourage disobedience to the Federal Constitution
which it is bound to uphold)."
111. United States v. Molina-Chacon, 627 F. Supp. 1253, 1259 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) ("The
guiding principle is that the exclusionary rule is not a constitutional right of an individual but
rather a judicially created device to deter police misconduct, to be applied only in those situa-
tions where this objective can be achieved." (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446-
47 (1976))).
112. United States v. La Chapelle, 869 F.2d 488, 489 (9th Cir. 1989) ("[g]enerally,
'[n]either our Fourth Amendment nor the judicially created exclusionary rule applies to acts of
foreign officials' " (quoting United States v. Maher, 645 F.2d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1981))); see
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Prior to Verdugo-Urquidez, courts fashioned three exceptions to the ad-
missibility of evidence seized in foreign searches.113 First, federal courts
would exclude evidence seized without a warrant if United States agents sub-
stantially participated in the search and seizure conducted outside the
United States, thus qualifying the operation as a "joint venture."'1 14 In
Stonehill v. United States,115 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reasoned that the Fourth Amendment applies to raids con-
ducted extraterritorially by foreign officials "only if Federal agents so sub-
stantially participated in the raids so as to convert them into joint ventures
between the United States and foreign officials."'116 The court held that raids
conducted in the Philippines by Philippine authorities without the participa-
tion of United States officials did not constitute substantial participation and,
therefore, did not invoke the joint venture exception to the admissibility of
evidence seized by unwarranted searches extraterritorially. 117
Second, courts have extended the exclusionary rule to the search and
seizure activities of foreign officers who were acting as "agents" of United
States officials. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held in United States v. Morrow118 that "if American law enforcement offi-
cials participated in the foreign search, or if the foreign authorities actually
conducting the search were acting as agents for their American counter-
parts, the exclusionary rule can be invoked."' 9 In Morrow, at the Federal
Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) suggestion, Canadian police conducted an
unwarranted search of the appellant's hotel room and recovered stolen se-
curities.12 The Canadian police then turned these items over to the FBI.
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 433(3)
(1987) (allowing for the admission of evidence obtained without a warrant if United States
officials are not implicated in the search and seizure).
113. In United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 139-41 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 956 (1977), Canadian officials conducted an unwarranted search of American citizens in
Toronto. The court delineated the standard of activity that would warrant applying the exclu-
sionary rule in a foreign search: first, joint participation in the search by United States and
foreign officials; second, foreign authorities acting as agents of United States officials; and
third, activity on the part of either United States or foreign agents that "shock the conscience"
of the court. Id.
114. Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960
(1969); see also Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949) (holding that if a federal
official "had a hand" in a search conducted with state authorities, the search must be consid-
ered a search by a federal official and, therefore, any evidence seized unconstitutionally under
the Fourth Amendment must be excluded under Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)).
115. 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968).
116. Id. at 743.
117. Id. at 746.
118. 537 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977).
119. Id. at 139.
120. Id.
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Federal prosecutors subsequently used the securities in the defendant's trial
in the United States.' 2 The court held that the FBI's minimal participation
in instigating the actual search did not require endowing the defendant with
Fourth Amendment protections.
122
Finally, federal courts have held that if the actions of the foreign officials
in gathering evidence so "shock[s] the conscience" of the court, the court
may invoke the exclusionary rule even without establishing agency between
United States and foreign officials.123 Under these guidelines, federal courts
have disallowed the admittance of evidence found to have been the result of
a foreign search and seizure in which United States participation was sub-
stantial or the behavior of the foreign officials somehow tainted the subse-
quent findings.1 24 The courts reasoned in the first two instances that the
121. Id.
122. Id. at 140.
123. Id. at 139. "[I]f the circumstances of the foreign search and seizure are so extreme
that they 'shock the judicial conscience,' a federal appellate court in the exercise of its supervi-
sory powers can require exclusion of the evidence so seized." Id. at 139 (citing Birdsell v.
United States, 346 F.2d 775, 782 n.10 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 963 (1965)).
124. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927) (holding that "substantial participa-
tion" on the part of United States officials is enough to warrant "joint operation"); Stonehill v.
United States, 405 F.2d 738, 746 (9th Cir. 1968) (holding that because United States agents did
not participate in raids of defendant's business in the Philippines, which would have been
illegal if conducted in United States, the court need not apply the Fourth Amendment under
the "joint venture" doctrine), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969).
Courts also have ruled that if an action on the part of foreign officials "shocks the con-
science" of the court, it will exclude any evidence discovered by such action. In United States
v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974), the defendant was convicted on a narcotics charge.
He argued that the court had no jurisdiction over him because his "presence ... had been
illegally obtained." Id. at 269. Through testimony, the court discovered that the defendant
had been severely tortured while in the custody of foreign officials and while United States
agents were present. Id. at 270. The United States agents were found to have participated in
some of the torture as well. Id. The appellate court overturned the lower court's ruling which
had allowed the admission of Toscanino's confession. Id. at 271. The lower court had relied
on the Ker-Frisbie doctrine which stated "that the government's power to prosecute a defend-
ant is not impaired by the illegality of the method by which it acquires control over him." Id.
at 271.
In Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886), federal officials forcibly abducted the appellant with-
out serving an issued arrest warrant. The Supreme Court held that no violation of due process
had occurred. Id. at 443. In Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952), United States officials
kidnapped the appellant from Illinois and took him to Michigan for trial. The Supreme Court
held that the "power of a court to try a person for a crime is not impaired by the fact that he
had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a 'forcible abduction.' " Id. at
522.
The Court's ruling in Toscanino reflected the erosion of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. The ero-
sion resulted from the expansion of the breadth of the Due Process Clause to include rights to
a fair procedure at trial. In Toscanino, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit wanted to avoid allowing the government to prosper from the "fruits of the [its] ex-
ploitation of its own misconduct." Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275. The court held that "the Bill
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exclusionary rule's purpose could be served by refusing to admit evidence
seized or gathered with United States participation. In the third instance,
the courts refused to be an accomplice to offensive and illegal activity.
These judicially created exceptions to the admissibility of evidence seized
in foreign countries relied on a theory of constitutional application which
restricted federal action both domestically and internationally. Courts had
supported this theory, holding that United States officials had acted uncon-
stitutionally.1 25  Moreover, the United States Supreme Court had even rec-
ognized a cause of action in cases where Fourth Amendment violations had
occurred.' 26 After Verdugo-Urquidez, however, the Court, by holding that
the Fourth Amendment does not restrict United States officials extraterrito-
rially, has rejected the joint venture and agency inclusions in the exclusion-
ary rule. 1
27
III. UNITED STATES V. VERDUGO-URQUIDEZ
In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,121 the Supreme Court adopted a
modified social compact theory of constitutional entitlement based on the
assumption that the Constitution applies only to certain members of the pop-
ulation. The Court abandoned the traditional Fourth Amendment analysis,
requiring a joint venture determination in lieu of a theory that broadly ex-
pands United States officials' capacity to gather evidence extraterritori-
ally.' 29 Members of the United States DEA believed the respondent, Rene
Verdugo-Urquidez, a citizen and resident of Mexico, to be a leader of a drug-
of Rights has extraterritorial application to the conduct abroad of federal agents directed
against United States citizens." Id. at 280. The court extended these rights to aliens "who are
the victims of such conduct .... Like the Fifth Amendment guarantee of due process, the
Fourth Amendment refers to and protects 'people' rather than 'areas.' " Id.; see also United
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228 (1942) (holding that "aliens as well as citizens are entitled to
the protection of the Fifth Amendment"); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S.
481 (1931) (holding that the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment required the
United States government to compensate a Russian citizen for property seized by the United
States).
125. See supra notes 112-14.
126. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); cf Committee of United
States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 950-53 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding
that Americans living in Nicaragua and allegedly tortured by the Contras-therefore, in the-
ory, with the Central Intelligence Agency's approval-do not have recourse in United States
courts); United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 909, 921 (D.D.C. 1988) (holding that a Lebanese
citizen can claim in federal court that he was tortured and kidnapped by United States agents),
rev'd on other grounds, 859 F.2d 953, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (reversing the District Court hold-
ing because defendant's Miranda rights were not violated).
127. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
128. 110 S. Ct. at 1056.
129. See id. 1065-66.
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smuggling organization. The government obtained a warrant for Verdugo-
Urquidez's arrest based on a complaint charging him with narcotics-related
offenses. 130 Mexican police, after consulting with United States marshals,
kidnapped Verdugo-Urquidez in Mexico and transported him to California,
where United States authorities arrested and imprisoned him.' 3 1
While Verdugo-Urquidez was in United States custody, a DEA agent sus-
pected that a search of Verdugo-Urquidez's residences in Mexico would re-
veal incriminating evidence relating to drug trafficking, as well as to the
kidnapping, torture and murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena
Salazar.' 32 In the search, DEA agents and officers of the Mexican Federal
Judicial Police recovered a "tally sheet" that the government sought to prof-
fer as evidence of the quantities of marijuana that Verdugo-Urquidez alleg-
edly smuggled into the United States.' 33 At no time did any United States
agent consult with an Assistant United States Attorney or attempt to acquire
a search warrant from a neutral magistrate to search Verdugo-Urquidez's
houses. 134
Verdugo-Urquidez moved to suppress the evidence procured by the DEA
agents in Mexico on the grounds that the agents had seized the tally sheet in
violation of the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, that it should be ex-
cluded under the exclusionary rule.' 31 The United States District Court for
the Southern District of California granted Verdugo-Urquidez's motion to
suppress, concluding that the Fourth Amendment applied to the extraterri-
torial searches and that absent exigent circumstances justifying the unwar-
ranted search, the evidence must be excluded. 136 A divided United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, relying in part on the
Supreme Court's ruling in Reid v. Covert,'37 and held that "[t]he Constitu-
tion imposes substantive constraints on the federal government, even when it
130. Id. at 1059. Verdugo-Urquidez was indicted under 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988) (engaging
in a continuing criminal enterprise), 21 U.S.C. § 963 (1988) (conspiring to import quantities of
marijuana), and 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1988) (possession with intent to distribute). Brief in Op-
position to Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit at 5, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990) (No. 88-1353).
131. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1059.
132. Id.
133. Id. A joint force of Mexican and American officers searched the respondent's resi-
dences. The searches were conducted at night, culminating at 4:00 a.m., at which time the
senior Mexican official requested that the United States officials remove evidence for examina-
tion at a later date. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1217 (9th Cir. 1988),
rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
134. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1216 n.2.
135. Id. at 1217.
136. Id.
137. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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operates abroad."' 3 8 The appellate court also relied on Immigration & Nat-
uralization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza, 139 in which the Supreme Court deter-
mined that illegal aliens residing in the United States acquired Fourth
Amendment protections, and argued by analogy that aliens incarcerated le-
gally within the United States are entitled to these same protections." ° The
court further argued that because Verdugo-Urquidez was entitled to "due
process under the fifth amendment, and to a fair trial under the sixth amend-
ment," it would be inconsistent to deny him Fourth Amendment rights. 41
The appellate court recognized that while a search warrant issued in the
United States would have no "legal validity" in Mexico,' 42 "it would have
substantial constitutional value in this country"' 43 based on the legitimacy
imparted when a neutral magistrate determines the scope and reasonableness
of a search and seizure. The majority concluded that the evidence seized in
Mexico should be excluded from trial because it was seized without a war-
rant in violation of the Fourth Amendment.'
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Wallace maintained that United States v.
Curtiss- Wright Export Corp. '45 controlled.' 46 In Curtiss, the Supreme Court
held that "[n]either the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it
have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens.' ' 47
Judge Wallace argued that the Constitution is a "'compact'... among the
people of the United States" and that the protection of the Fourth Amend-
ment was only guaranteed to "the people" who assented to that "compact,"
the citizens of the United States. 148
The Supreme Court incorporated Judge Wallace's dissent in large part
when it reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision. The Court analyzed the case
from three perspectives. First, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that
Verdugo-Urquidez lacked a sufficient connection with the United States to
merit protection of the Constitution."' Chief Justice Rehnquist relied on a
historical and textual analysis to support his theory of the Constitution as a
social compact." ° Second, the Court argued that prior case law had estab-
138. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1218.
139. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
140. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1223.
141. Id. at 1224.
142. Id. at 1230.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
146. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1230 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
147. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318.
148. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1231 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
149. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1066 (1990).
150. Id. at 1061-62.
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lished that the Constitution does not necessarily extend to all government
action. Instead, the majority maintained that the United States agents' par-
ticipation in the search in Mexico was exempted from constitutional re-
straints.' Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist framed Verdugo-Urquidez's
case as raising a separation of powers issue and argued that it is in the na-
tional interest to defer to the executive branch's authority when conducting
international criminal investigations.' 52
A. The Constitution as Social Compact-Establishing a Sufficient
Connection
Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that under a social compact theory,
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is
guaranteed only to those individuals who are entitled to protection as con-
tracting parties in the compact.' 3 He supported his interpretation by exam-
ining the Framers' choice of the term "the people" as the subject of the
Fourth Amendment. By analogy, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the
Court should interpret the Fourth Amendment in the same manner as the
Preamble, the First, Second, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments, as well as Arti-
cle I, Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution. '54 In each of these sections,
the Court found that the Framers intended to convey rights to "a class of
persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise devel-
oped sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that
community."' 5 5 Because Verdugo-Urquidez's only connection with the
United States was his incarceration in California on drug charges, the Court
concluded that his connection was not substantial enough to include him as
a participant in the national community.' 56 The Court implied that
Verdugo-Urquidez might have established a substantial connection to the
United States if he had resided in the United States for a longer period of
time and, perhaps, had entered the United States voluntarily.
1 57
151. Id. at 1064.
152. See id. at 1065-66.
153. Id. at 1061.
154. Id.
155. Id. (citing United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904)). In Turner,
the Court held that an illegal alien was not entitled to First Amendment privileges because he
was not a person under the Constitution. The Turner Court found that simply entering the
country, especially illegally, is not sufficient to warrant constitutional protection. Turner, 194
U.S. at 292. To determine whether an alien is entitled to First Amendment protections, the
Court will consider whether he or she is part of the "people" to whom these rights are guaran-
teed. Id. The majority in Verdugo-Urquidez applied this holding by analogy to nonresident
aliens. Id. at 1065.
156. Id. at 1064.
157. Id. at 1064-65.
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The Court then provided a historical overview of the Fourth Amendment,
explaining that its adoption was designed to protect citizens from the unrea-
sonable government searches which were a recurring pre-Revolutionary
abuse of authority. 5 ' According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Framers
originally rejected the Fourth Amendment, believing that the national gov-
ernment would not have the authority to conduct searches.' 59 Because the
debate concerning the Amendment's inclusion focused on the government's
authority in relation to its citizens, the Court suggested that this necessarily
excludes its application to any noncitizens."6 The Court explained that the
debate concerning the Fourth Amendment made clear that the Framers
wished to restrain the government's ability to search and seize in a domestic
capacity only. Though the fear of unregulated government searches and
seizures resulted in the Fourth Amendment's inclusion in the Bill of Rights,
the Court maintained that there is no evidence that the Framers intended the
Fourth Amendment to apply to "activities of the United States directed
against aliens in a foreign territory."''
After recognizing that the protection of the Constitution only extends to
those who have entered the "compact of the Constitution," the majority next
determined who is party to the social compact and who makes up "the per-
sons" the Constitution seeks to protect.' 6 2 Chief Justice Rehnquist main-
tained that the cases cited by the respondent that extended constitutional
rights to aliens' 63 turned on whether the aliens resided within the boundaries
of the United States and "developed substantial connections with this coun-
try."I' According to the majority, Verdugo-Urquidez was "an alien with
no previous significant voluntary connection with the United States" and,
therefore, was not entitled to constitutional protections.' 65 Although, as
Justice Stevens pointed out in his concurrence, Verdugo-Urquidez was
158. Id. at 1061.
159. Id.; see CHARLES C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 508-09 (1937);
THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 578-79 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961).
160. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1061.
161. Id. The Court pointed to the "undeclared war" between the United States and
France, wherein Congress authorized President Adams to instruct United States ships to seize,
among others, any French ship found in United States waters or "'elsewhere, on the high
seas.'" Id. at 1062 (quoting An Act Further to Protect the Commerce of the United States,
ch. 68, § 1, 1 Stat. 578 (1978)). The majority maintained that the Framers never suggested
that the Fourth Amendment restrained this type of activity. Id. Arguably, however, although
no party sued the government under this argument, this omission does not necessarily legiti-
mize President Adams' instructions. Additionally, these cases are fundamentally distinguish-
able because they involve acts of war.
162. Id. at 1061.
163. See supra notes 10-12.
164. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1064.
165. Id.
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within the confines of the United States' borders when the searches were
conducted in Mexico, the majority held that "this sort of presence-lawful
but involuntary-is not the sort to indicate any substantial connection with
our country." 166 Chief Justice Rehnquist carefully limited the Court's hold-
ing to the facts in Verdugo-Urquidez, where the search of the respondent's
residence took place five days after his arrest and incarceration in the United
States. 167 Chief Justice Rehnquist did not rule on whether incarceration for
an extended period of time would create a substantial connection, but rather,
he maintained that the "fortuitous" circumstances that brought the respon-
dent to the United States when the search occurred should not control the
constitutionality of the search.
161
B. Precedent and the Rights of Foreign Nationals
In his analysis of the foreign application of the Constitution, Chief Justice
Rehnquist argued that cases granting illegal aliens Fourth Amendment pro-
tections should be read narrowly and are distinguishable from Verdugo-Ur-
quidez on their facts. 169 The Court relied on the Insular 70 cases to support
the proposition that "not every constitutional provision applies to govern-
mental activity, even where the United States has sovereign power." ''
Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that because constitutional rights do not
necessarily extend to aliens in territories that Congress ultimately governs,
the Constitution does not protect nonresident, extraterritorial aliens, whose
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1064-68. The Court first addressed Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lo-
pez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984). Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that the Lopez-Mendoza
decision stood merely for the proposition that the exclusionary rule should apply to illegal
aliens' deportation hearings, but not to illegal aliens as a whole. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct.
at 1064-65. Therefore, the Court maintained, it is "not dispositive of how the Court would
rule on a Fourth Amendment claim by illegal aliens." Id. at 1065. Chief Justice Rehnquist
further posited that Lopez-Mendoza can be distinguished on the grounds that Verdugo-Ur-
quidez is neither an illegal alien nor a voluntary resident of the United States. Id.
Relying on Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), in which the Court struck down
state statutes that denied welfare benefits to resident aliens, Verdugo-Urquidez argued that
treating aliens differently from United States citizens violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1065. The Court countered this
argument by referring to Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976), in which the Court held that
Congress need not provide to all aliens the benefits that it is required to provide to citizens. Id.
at 80. The majority in Verdugo-Urquidez argued that the Constitution, therefore, "expressly
accord[s] differing protections to aliens than to citizens." Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at
1065.
170. See supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
171. Verdugo-Urguidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1062.
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connection to the United States government is even more attenuated.1 72
Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the view that every constitutional provision
is applicable wherever the United States chooses to exercise its power. 73
C. Separation of Powers
Along with its textual analysis of the Constitution, the Court placed
strong stock in its view that under the constitutionally mandated separation
of powers, the executive branch should be free to carry out its foreign and
domestic policy objectives without constitutional restraint.' 7 4 Chief Justice
Rehnquist suggested that the holding of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Verdugo- Urquidez would inhibit not only law enforcement operations, but
also foreign policy operations.' 75 According to the majority, requiring a
United States law enforcement agent to acquire a search warrant prior to
searching a suspect's home outside of the United States would hamstring
government officials' efforts to enforce drug laws and conduct foreign pol-
icy. 176 The majority feared that enforcing the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment would swamp the courts with lengthy case-by-case ad-
judications. 7 7 Chief Justice Rehnquist maintained that the lower court's
"global view" would "plunge [legislators and executive officials] into a sea of
uncertainty as to what might be reasonable in the way of searches and
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1063. Chief Justice Rehnquist distinguished Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957),
holding that the extraterritorial application of the Constitution is limited to United States
citizens and does not constrain federal officials if they are acting outside the United States
against a non-citizen. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1063.
174. Verdugo-Urguidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1066.
175. Id. at 1065-66.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1065. The Court was concerned with increased adjudications due to recognition
of new causes of action under the Fourth Amendment. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971) (holding that when a federal
agent "acting under color of his authority" violate's the Fourth Amendment, this "gives rise to
a cause of action for damages"). In Bivens, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics arrested the re-
spondent and manacled and searched him in front of his family without a warrant. The Court
held the respondent was entitled to recover money damages as a result of the federal agents
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 397; see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11
(1985) (striking down a Tennessee statute that allowed a police officer to use whatever force
necessary to effect an arrest). The Garner Court reasoned that an apprehension is a seizure
under the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, it must be reasonable. The Court held that
disallowing the use of deadly force in a situation where it was obvious that neither the police
officer nor any bystander was at risk would not "severely hamper effective law enforcement."
Id. at 19; see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989) (finding that questions
concerning excessive force in an investigatory stop should be analyzed under the reasonable-
ness standard of the Fourth Amendment).
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seizures conducted abroad."' 78  The majority concluded that the Court
should not impede the executive branch's ability to function effectively in the
international arena. The Court maintained that any restrictions on extrater-
ritorial searches and seizures "must be imposed by the political branches
through diplomatic understanding, treaty, or legislation."' 179
1. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy denied that the Constitution
extended protection to "some undefined, limitless class of non-citizens who
are beyond our territory,"' ° but maintained that the term "the people"
should not be interpreted as "a source restricting [the Fourth Amendment's]
protections."'' Justice Kennedy based his conclusion that the Constitution
does not extend to nonresident aliens on "general principles of interpreta-
tion.""' He posited that because the government can act only as the Consti-
tution mandates, the issue is what the Constitution mandates in respect to
nonresident aliens.' 8 3 Justice Kennedy interpreted constitutional protec-
tions "in light of the undoubted power of the United States to take actions to
assert its legitimate power and authority abroad." 184 Justice Kennedy rea-
soned that this authority must be weighed against the facts of each case in an
effort to devise what rights the Constitution necessarily guarantees. 8 5 By
weighing the circumstances in this case, Justice Kennedy concluded that
"[t]he conditions and considerations of this case would make adherence to
the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement impractible and
anomalous."18
6
178. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1066.
179. Id.
180. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy argued that although the Constitution
does not extend extraterritorially, United States criminal statutes do. Id.
Justice Stevens also concurred, but disagreed with the majority's contention that Verdugo-
Urquidez was not one of the "people" entitled to constitutional protection. Id. at 1068 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens posited that Verdugo-Urquidez's lawful presence in the
United States afforded him Fourth Amendment protection, but that the seized tally sheet need
not be excluded because the search was reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes. Id.
181. Id. at 1067 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Alternatively, Justice Kennedy asserted that
the Framers' choice of the "people" may have been to "underscore the importance" of the
right to be free from unreasonable searches. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1067-68.
186. Id. at 1067. The facts Justice Kennedy looked to were the absence of local judges to
issue warrants, the different sense of reasonableness and privacy abroad, and the need to coop-
erate with foreign officials. Id. at 1068.
1991]
Catholic University Law Review
2. Justice Brennan's Dissent
Justice Brennan responded in his dissent that "at the very least, the
Fourth Amendment is an unavoidable correlative of the Government's
power to enforce the criminal law."' 7 Justice Brennan claimed that
although the majority agreed that "the people" includes non-United States
citizens, the majority failed to satisfactorily define what constituted a "suffi-
cient connection." 8 8 Justice Brennan asserted that at one point the major-
ity required that aliens must have a "substantial connection" to the
community to be considered part of "the people," while at other times it
suggested that merely a voluntary presence and an acceptance of some "soci-
etal obligations" should be enough.' 8 9 The dissent maintained that "the
people" should be interpreted "as a rhetorical counterpoint to 'the govern-
ment,' such that rights that were reserved to 'the people' were to protect all
those subject to 'the government.' "190 The thrust of the dissent's analysis
revolved around whether an individual is subject to the government to the
extent that he could be considered one of the "governed." Justice Brennan
asserted that the United States government has created a significant connec-
tion to Verdugo-Urquidez by "attempting to hold him accountable under
United States criminal laws."' 9' He argued the fact that the respondent may
be sentenced to spend the rest of his life in a prison in the United States
makes him a member of the community and "one of the governed."' 92 The
dissent asserted that "fundamental fairness" requires that if an individual is
subject to the laws of the United States, the United States should afford the
individual a corresponding constitutional protection. 19 3
Justice Brennan summarized the Court's decision as holding that "foreign
nationals must abide by our laws... [while] our Government need not abide
by the Fourth Amendment when it investigates them for violations of our
187. Id. at 1070 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1072.
191. Id. at 1071.
192. Id. at 1070-71.
193. Id. at 1071. Justice Brennan quoted James Madison in a speech against the Alien and
Sedition Acts. " 'Aliens are no more parties to the laws than they are parties to the Constitu-
tion; yet it will not be disputed that, as they owe on one hand, a temporary obedience, they are
entitled in return to their protection and advantage.' "'Id. (quoting JAMES MADISON, REPORT
ON THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS (1800), reprinted in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 556 (2d ed. 1836)).
Justice Brennan also made an Equal Protection argument, asserting that because it is possi-
ble that a citizen of the United States will be tried as a codefendant in the same trial for the
same crime with a non-United States citizen-international criminal conspiracy for example-
it is discriminatory that the Constitution protects one defendant from unreasonable searches
but not the other. Id. at 1071.
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laws."' 9 4 He argued that the United States government continuously has
sought to charge foreign nationals with crimes committed under federal laws
for "conduct committed entirely beyond the territorial limits of the United
States." 195 Because Congress' sole source of authority to enforce these laws
is the Constitution, Justice Brennan criticized the Court's holding as creat-
ing "an antilogy: the Constitution authorizes our Government to enforce
our criminal laws abroad, but when Government agents exercise this author-
ity, the Fourth Amendment does not travel with them."'1
96
Justice Brennan concluded that the majority placed undue emphasis on
the fact that the Framers used the term "person" and "accused" in the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments in contrast to "the people" in the Fourth.'9 7 The
majority asserted that this difference intentionally broadens the scope of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments to all defendants in criminal prosecutions, re-
gardless of their ties to the United States, and limits the scope of the Fourth
Amendment to encompass only the "people" in compact with the United
States.' Justice Brennan demonstrated that the phraseology of the Fourth
Amendment would be rather awkward if "person" were to replace "the peo-
ple."' 99 Likewise, he explained that the Framers could not have used the
term "accused" in the Fourth Amendment because the Fourth Amendment
does not apply solely to those accused of crimes. ° ° Justice Brennan sug-
gested a purely syntactical reason for the use of the term "people" in the
Fourth Amendment and effectively undermined the majority's emphasis on
this choice of phrase.
194. Id. at 1068.
195. Id.; see, e.g., 46 U.S.C. § 1903(h) app. (1988) (proscribing the manufacture, distribu-
tion and possession of controlled substances on vessels in international waters); 21 U.S.C.
§§ 959, 963 (1988) (making illegal the manufacture, distribution and possession of controlled
substances outside the United States, for purposes of either unlawful importation into the
United States or conspiracy to violate federal narcotics law); 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1988) (defining
"persons" to include non-citizens abroad in applying the Sherman Act antitrust laws);
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 1968) (applying Securities laws to trans-
actions outside the United States if they involve United States registered stock and adversely
affect investors in the United States), rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
196. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1069-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 1072 n.9.
198. Id. at 1063.
199. Id. The American Civil Liberties Union argued in its amicus brief to the Supreme
Court in Verdugo-Urquidez that the most likely reason for the use of the term "people" was
"to avoid the awkward rhetorical redundancy that would have been caused if 'persons' were
used." Brief for Amici Curiae by the American Civil Liberties Union at 9, United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990) (No. 88-1353). For example, it would have been
extremely awkward for the clause to read the right of "persons" to be secure in their persons is
guaranteed.
200. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1072 n.9 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
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Justice Brennan explained that the Framers intended to shape a govern-
ment of limited powers, one which would be markedly different from the
unrestrained plenary authority of pre-revolutionary British domination.
20 1
He argued that "Americans vehemently attacked the notion that rights were
matters of 'favor and grace,' given to the people from the government., 20 2
Instead, he maintained, the Bill of Rights merely prohibited government
from infringing on "pre-existing" or naturally endowed rights and liber-
ties.23 Justice Brennan asserted that the Fourth Amendment's assurance
that the people are to be safe from unreasonable searches and seizures simply
upholds a basic human right. Because these rights are inherent in all per-
sons, Justice Brennan reasoned that "delineating protected groups would
have been inconsistent with the drafters' fundamental conception of a Bill of
Rights.' ,204
Additionally, Justice Brennan pointed out that the majority's analysis im-
plies that a foreign national who had " 'developed sufficient connection with
this country to be considered part of [the] community' would be protected
by the Fourth Amendment regardless of the location of the search," thereby
imbuing the foreign national with constitutional rights.20 5 According to Jus-
tice Brennan, however, this reasoning would conflict with the majority's
holding that the Constitution does not apply extraterritorially.
201. Id. at 1072-73.
202. Id. at 1073; see also B. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 182, 187 (1967).
203. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1073 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
204. Id. Justice Brennan argued that the drafters of the Bill of Rights chose not to explic-
itly limit the Fourth Amendment. Both New York's and Virginia's conventions wanted to
ratify that every "freeman" was to be secure from searches and seizures. But the drafters
rejected this limiting statement. Justice Brennan maintained that there are no background
historical papers that suggest the Framers intended any limitations as to the class of persons
the Fourth Amendment protects. Id. Justice Brennan argued that the cases the majority used
to illustrate the historical perspective indicating an intent to limit its breadth solely to non-
foreigners are not on point. Id. at 1073-74 & n.10.
205. Id. at 1070 n.7 (quoting id. at 1061 (majority opinion)). Justice Brennan rejected the
majority's reading of the controlling cases. He maintained that the majority interpreted John-
son v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), to reject broadly the claim that aliens are guaranteed
Fifth Amendment rights. See supra text accompanying notes 56-63. In contrast, Justice Bren-
nan argued that Johnson applies solely to enemy aliens at war with the United States, and that
the Insular cases are "inapposite" because they deal with the protections accused persons enjoy
when tried by territorial authorities in territorial courts. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1074
(Brennan, J., dissenting). According to Justice Brennan, the holding in Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1 (1957), had long ago limited the Insular cases to their individual facts, and, therefore,
these cases hold no analytical value when dealing with Fourth Amendment assertions by crim-
inal defendants in federal court. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1074 n. 1 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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By focusing on the function of the Fourth Amendment, Justice Brennan
countered the majority's argument that the Court should defer to the execu-
tive branch in foreign policy questions. 2°6 He asserted that the Fourth
Amendment's role is to assure that a neutral magistrate decides the reasona-
bleness of the contemplated search.2"7 According to Justice Brennan, the
neutrality of the magistrate is determinative. 20 8 He reasoned that the Court
cannot ignore the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment simply because
Congress has not given United States magistrates explicit authority to issue
warrants for foreign searches. 2' Similarly, he argued that the judiciary,
rather than Congress, should "define the contours" of the Constitution.21°
"The need to protect those suspected of criminal activity from the unbridled
discretion of investigating officers is no less important abroad than at
home.,2
11
Justice Brennan reiterated that policy dictates enforcement of the stric-
tures of the Warrant Clause.21 2 He argued that when United States officials
act in an unconstitutional manner abroad they are not functioning in a legiti-
mate foreign policy capacity,213 and asserted that if the United States re-
spects the inherent rights of foreign nationals, the United States will
cultivate reciprocal respect.21 4
Finally, responding to the majority's concern that allowing aliens Fourth
Amendment rights would "disrupt the ability of the political branches to
respond to foreign situations,",2'1 the dissent argued that, in cases of national
security, federal officials could circumvent the warrant requirement by stat-
ing existing exigent circumstances. 216 There may be instances when "offen-
206. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1074-75.
207. Id. at 1076.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1077.
210. Id.
211. Id. Justice Brennan also pointed out that the United States'Army has recognized that
a warrant issued by a judicial court is necessary when they wish to intercept a wire or oral
communication abroad. Id. at 1077 n.14.
212. Id. at 1077.
213. Id. at 1071.
214. Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting), overruled by Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967)). Justice Brandeis argued that
"[i]f the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; . . . it invites anar-
chy." Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485. To the extent federal officials ignore basic human rights,
United States citizens' respect for the Constitution and the rights embodied in it will eventually
erode.
215. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1065; id. at 1075 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 1075 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973)
(holding that fingernail scrapings recovered from a suspect without a warrant were admissible
due to the existence of probable cause and the easy destructibility of the evidence).
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sive use of constitutional rights should be limited, '217 but, according to
Justice Brennan, if the executive branch wants to use the evidence seized in a
foreign search, it must first obtain a valid search warrant.2"'
IV. THE CONSTITUTION AS AN EMBODIMENT OF NATURAL RIGHTS
The majority's ruling indicates that the Supreme Court is willing to play a
less active role in fashioning constitutional solutions to foreign policy issues.
By embracing the social compact theory, the Court limits the scope of the
Constitution and, therefore, in effect reduces the reach of the Fourth
Amendment. Recent decisions where federal and state officials have been
granted a broader scope of authority in domestic search and seizure situa-
tions219 and cases involving border 22° and administrative searches illustrates
the Court's trend to limit the effect of the Constitution.221
Chief Justice Rehnquist decided the issue of constitutional applicability in
a manner inconsistent with precedence. His analysis of those who are incor-
porated in the Constitution as "the people" superficially addresses whether
217. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1075; see Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516
(1951) (upholding the constitutionality of the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 11 (1946), because advo-
cating the overthrow of the United States government was a "substantial enough interest for
the Government to limit speech"); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944) (find-
ing the forced internment of American citizens of Japanese descent during World War II was
constitutional as a necessary response to the waging of war); Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (holding that a pamphlet that advocated avoiding the draft violated the
Espionage Act and that the First Amendment did not protect such speech).
218. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1077 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun
asserts in his dissent that although American agents acting abroad are not generally exercising
sovereign authority over foreign nationals, when United States federal officials hold such na-
tionals accountable for United States criminal laws, they are "the governed" and, therefore,
are entitled to Fourth Amendment protections. Id. at 1078 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "[T]he
enforcement of domestic criminal law seems to me to be the paradigmatic exercise of sover-
eignty over those who are compelled to obey." Id.
In applying the Fourth Amendment, Justice Blackmun maintains that the Warrant Clause is
inapplicable, arguing that United States magistrates lack jurisdictional authority extraterritori-
ally. Id. He does contend, however, that the agents' actions in Verdugo-Urquidez may have
violated the Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment, and would have remanded the
case for further fact finding. Id.
219. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337 (1990) (holding that "[t]he Fourth Amendment
permits a properly limited protective sweep in conjunction with an in-home arrest when the
searching officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the
area to be swept harbors an individual posing danger to those on the arrest scene").
220. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 544 (1985) (holding that the
detaining of a suspected drug smuggler by customs officials for over 16 hours and subsequently
removing her to a hospital and subjecting her to a rectal examination without a warrant was
constitutional).
221. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); see also supra notes
25-26 and accompanying text.
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individuals are sufficiently "connected" to it to merit constitutional protec-
tion. The prospect of life in prison should qualify Verdugo-Urquidez as one
who is "governed" by United States authority, and should categorize him as
sufficiently connected to the United States community to inherit the mantle
of constitutional protections. The simplicity of the majority's textual analy-
sis ignores the heart of the Fourth Amendment's protection and the values
and ideals upon which it is based.
The social compact theory of the Constitution is just one of two ap-
proaches to analyzing the scope of the Fourth Amendment. The Constitu-
tion can also be viewed as a collection of laws, limiting and restricting the
actions of the government itself, thereby allowing the people to retain their
naturally endowed rights. According to one constitutional commentator,
the Court has inconsistently applied the compact theory.22 2 This inconsis-
tency is at the root of the Court's failure to establish a determinative stan-
dard by which an individual is judged to be part of the community and,
therefore, endowed with constitutional rights.22 3 In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,2 24
the Court extended the compact to aliens within the boundary of the United
States, reasoning that a substantial connection to the community existed
when the individual voluntarily crossed the border.2 25 In In re Ross, 2 2
6
however, the Court refused to apply the social compact theory to encompass
all individuals under the authority of the United States government. Finally,
in Reid v. Covert,227 the Court, in effect, overturned Ross and broadened the
application and scope of constitutional protections by holding that "individ-
ual rights must be respected whenever and wherever federal officials act." 2 28
The Reid holding, if read to include both citizens and non-citizens of the
United States, can be interpreted to require a respect of individual rights and
to limit governmental intrusions to a constitutional standard of reasonable-
ness. The fact that the natural rights described in the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights antecede both documents reflects the Framers' "commitment
to respect the individual rights of all human beings."' 229 The lack of explicit
geographical and population characterizations in the Constitution is inten-
tional and allows for a broader reading of the Constitution's scope. 23' As
the Fifty-Sixth Congress stated in its report to the House of Representatives
222. Henkin, supra note 29, at 31.
223. Id.
224. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
225. Id. at 369.
226. 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
227. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
228. Henkin, supra note 29, at 31.
229. Id. at 32.
230. Id.
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in 1900, the "United States' authority to act abroad stems from the Consti-
tution; the Government must therefore accept the limits provided by the
same document that is the source of its power.",231 When the Court shifts
the focus from the government's duty to the individual's status, it is explic-
itly weighing the community's interest against the individual's interest.2 32
This analysis undermines the basic values of the individual rights protected
by the Fourth Amendment and enforced judicially by the exclusion of im-
properly seized evidence. The exclusionary rule acts not only to protect in-
dividual rights but also to ensure that the judiciary does not become an
"accomplice after the fact."' 233
The majority relied on the Insular cases in its argument that the Constitu-
tion does not extend beyond the United States' borders and interpreted Reid
to control only in situations where the United States was acting against a
citizen in a territory of the United States. It is equally legitimate, however,
to hold, as Justice Brennan did in his dissent, that Reid effectively overturns
the Insular cases by maintaining that they do not rule on the constitutional-
ity of actions taken by United States agents outside the United States, but
rather deal solely with the actions of local extraterritorial authorities.2 34
The Insular cases can also be distinguished because they rely on Congress'
authority under Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution to regulate all terri-
tory belonging to the United States. 235 Because the United States has no
sovereign authority over foreign nations, it is unnecessary for the Court to
weigh Congress' plenary power against an individual's Fourth Amendment
rights. The Insular cases can be understood to stand for the principle that a
United States citizen is not necessarily guaranteed constitutional rights if
tried in a United States territory.236 If citizens are not prosecuted by the
United States government, their rights under the Constitution cannot take
effect. The Insular cases do not control in Verdugo-Urquidez because the
231. S. REP. No. 249, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1900); see Jules Lobel, The Constitution
Abroad, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 871, 873 (1989).
232. Lobel, supra note 231, at 873.
233. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351 (1974) (holding that evidence seized
outside the scope of a search warrant can be used in Grand Jury proceedings as a derivative
use of illegally seized evidence but cannot be entered during trial).
234. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1074 (Brennan J., dissenting); see also United States
v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227, 249 (U.S. Ct. for Berlin, 1979) ("IT]he Insular Cases examined the
extent to which a criminal defendant in a territory administered or governed by the United
States was the beneficiary of the rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution, regard-
less of whether the United States itself was the prosecuting authority.").
235. Brief for Amici Curiae by the American Civil Liberties Union at 14, United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990) (No. 88-1353). The purpose of that clause was to
allow a territory to use its own laws and customs if necessary and or desired. Id.
236. Id
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issue of territorial authority is not implicated and because the United States
government is the prosecuting agent.
The majority's ruling reverses a long-standing policy of holding federal
officials accountable for their operations conducted in concert with foreign
officials in a foreign country. 237 The facts of the search in Verdugo-Urquidez
exemplify an instance when the "joint venture" rule should apply. Because
United States agents were acting in conjunction with Mexican officials, the
agents should be held to the constitutional standard mandated by the Fourth
Amendment. Procedurally, this simply would require a federal official to
procure a search warrant proscribing the scope of the search. Over the
course of time that it took to gain Mexican approval for the search, DEA
agents could have presented their warrant request to a United States magis-
trate, including a list of what they hoped the search would recover. Nothing
in the facts of Verdugo-Urquidez makes this constitutional requirement un-
reasonable or unmanageable. The problem is not so much one of forcing a
United States officer to conform to both the foreign country's criminal pro-
cedure as well as to the United States Constitution, but rather one of main-
taining a consistent standard of judicial review.238
The unfairness of subjecting a nonresident alien to the criminal process,
while refusing him the constitutional protection that is integral to that pro-
cess, erodes the values and ideals the Fourth Amendment and will inevita-
bly undermine confidence in the Constitution at home.239 In an increasingly
interdependent world, it is important to accept a notion of "human rights"
that, as Justice Story wrote in the early nineteenth century, "arise from the
law of nature, and the gift of Providence, and are incapable of being trans-
ferred or surrendered. ' 240
For a number of years, the Court has granted United States officials lib-
erty of movement in their foreign criminal investigations and in the carrying
out of foreign policy.241 The Court subjected United States law enforcement
237. See supra notes 112-24 and accompanying text.
238. The majority ignored a separate issue raised by the defendant in his brief against
granting a writ of certiorari. Verdugo-Urquidez argued that DEA agents brought back docu-
ments in a suitcase to the United States and searched through them in California without a
warrant. He asserted that United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), and United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), should apply, both of which require a warrant to search documents
removed from the scene of seizure. Verdugo-Urquidez maintained that these documents were
searched inside the United States where there is no question that the Fourth Amendment
controls and, therefore, should be excluded from trial as having been illegally searched without
a warrant.
239. See Lobel, supra note 231, at 874.
240. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 340, at 309 (1833).
241. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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officials to constitutional restraints when conducting searches abroad if the
search involved a "joint venture" without exigent circumstances.242 The
"joint venture" standard was minimally restrictive and faithfully upheld
years of judicial attempts to correctly restrain oppressive government activ-
ity. Verdugo-Urquidez effectively overrules the "joint venture" qualification
and replaces an historical restraint imposed by the Fourth Amendment on
any search conducted intra or extraterritorially with a per se rule that allows
United States officials to conduct open-ended and unwarranted searches if
performed outside the United States against a non-United States citizen.
The executive branch unsuccessfully attempted to broaden this unchecked
authority in a subsequent foreign criminal proceeding. In United States v.
Caro-Quintero,243 the Supreme Court granted certiorari on a case that ad-
dressed whether a nonresident alien, kidnapped and transported to the
United States from Mexico withput official Mexican approval and, in viola-
tion of an existing extradition treaty between the two countries, must be
returned to Mexico. Caro-Quintero arose from circumstances similar to
Verdugo-Urquidez in that United States officials suspected that the respon-
dent, a Mexican national, was involved in the kidnapping, torture, and mur-
der of DEA agent Enrique Camenara. 24 The United States District Court
for the Central District of California held that because the Mexican Govern-
ment had protested the kidnapping in a diplomatic letter, and because a le-
gitimate extradition process existed that the United States government failed
to follow, the respondent should be returned to Mexico.245
The government argued that the court contravened precedent, relying in
part on Justice Wallace's reasoning in the appellate court's dissent in
Verdugo-Urquidez. Justice Wallace had maintained that separation-of-
powers principles circumscribe the supervisory power of federal courts.
Thus a federal court can only exercise its supervisory power" 'when a recog-
nized [federal] right has been violated.' ,246 As Justice Wallace stated,
"[A]ny attempt on our part to create a new exclusionary rule would be
242. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
243. 745 F. Supp. 599 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd sub noma. United States v. Alvarez-Machain,
946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 35 (1992).
244. Id. at 601-02. The United States had been close to arranging an exchange for Alvarez
with the Mexican government when a television miniseries aired that was based on the
Camenara story. Although the political ramifications in Mexico resulted in the Mexican gov-
ernment revoking the exchange, Alvarez was subsequently kidnapped by Mexican police of-
ficers without official Mexican approval and transported to the United States. Id. at 603.
245. Id. at 604. The government argued that the extradition treaty had not been violated
because the Mexican government had not officially invoked it. Id.
246. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1247-48 (9th Cir. 1988) (altera-
tion in original) (quoting United States v. Gatto, 763 F.2d 1040, 1046 (9th Cir. 1985)).
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doubly offensive to principles of separation-of-powers, because we would be
attempting to direct the actions of United States executive officials abroad
.. "247 Finally, the government relied on Chief Justice Rehnquist's asser-
tion in Verdugo-Urquidez that any restrictions on extraterritorial activity
"must be imposed by the political branches through diplomatic understand-
ing, treaty or legislation." '248 The focus of the government's arguments illus-
trates the lengths to which Verdugo-Urquidez can be extended.
Other agencies of the executive branch have also jumped on the Verdugo-
Urquidez wagon, interpreting Verdugo-Urquidez in a manner allowing unre-
strained government action abroad. Officials at the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) have stated that the Verdugo-Urquidez decision "does
have implications for enforcement matters generally, and that would include
securities regulations.
249
One issue left unanswered by Verdugo-Urquidez is whether evidence
seized illegally under both the host country's procedures and the United
States Constitution would still be admissible under a "reverse silver platter"
doctrine. It appears from Verdugo-Urquidez that evidence not admissible in
the host country could be given to United States officials to use in domestic
prosecutions. It is certain that the converse application, in which a foreign
official conducted an illegal search in the United States, would be unpalat-
able to the average American citizen who expects Fourth Amendment pro-
tections to create a cause of action against an offending search party. The
reverse must hold true as well.25 °
After Verdugo-Urquidez, courts may allow federal officials uncondition-
ally to enter a foreign country, conduct a warrantless and unlimited search,
with or without the host country's permission, and then return to the United
States with evidence fully admissible in a domestic criminal proceeding.25 1
The basic protection of the Fourth Amendment, mandating an independent
247. Id. at 1248.
248. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1066 (1990).
249. Bureau of International Affairs, Inc., Court Ruling May Impact SECs Overseas En-
forcement, March 12, 1990, Vol. 3, No. 7, at 6. According to a Georgetown University law
professor, the Verdugo-Urquidez decision makes clear that "SEC employees can help foreign
investigators overseas gather evidence ... [that] would otherwise have violated our Fourth
Amendment and which would be admissible in a court in the United States." Id.
250. Although the issue was not presented, it is not clear that the search in Mexico com-
plied with the Mexican Constitution's procedural requirements. See Jacqueline A. Weisman,
Extraordinary Rendition: A One- Way Ticket to the United States... Or is it?, 41 CATm. U. L.
REV. - (1992).
251. Brief for Amici Curiae by the American Civil Liberties Union at 8, United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990) (No. 88-1353). The government is now "free to
conduct warrantless searches without probable cause whenever the individual being prose-
cuted is a foreign national and his residence lies beyond our borders." Id.
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validation of an officer's probable cause, is circumvented once the location of
the search is extraterritorial. In a "wild west" mentality, a lone law officer
now has the authority to define how, when, and what he will search regard-
less of the reasonableness of his or her assumptions or motivations.
V. CONCLUSION
The "joint venture" and agency tests for constitutionality of searches con-
ducted in foreign countries have been rendered immaterial by the United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez holding. Today, it is unnecessary for a United
States official to acquire a warrant to search a nonresident alien outside of
the United States. Foreign nationals, however, are required to conduct
themselves in a manner consistent with United States law or be subject to
prosecution. This double standard can only subvert United States relations
with foreign countries at a time when co-dependence and cooperation are
more necessary than ever. An inequitable approach to judicial enforcement
may hamper an allied approach to drug control and to combatting interna-
tional terrorism.
The manner in which the United States conducts its foreign criminal in-
vestigations and prosecutions has far reaching effects on how it is perceived
in the international community. Prior to Verdugo- Urquidez, when the Court
refused to accept evidence that was procured unconstitutionally, it was send-
ing a message to the world concerning the integrity of the standards by
which the United States government conducted the internal control of its
prosecutorial system. In holding that the Constitution does not extend ex-
traterritorially, the Court undermines United States efforts to encourage
other countries to emulate our system of laws and compromises the very
basis of that system, the Constitution.
Janet E. Mitchell
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